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ABSTRAeT 
In economies with public goods, we provide a necessary and sufficient con-
dition Cor the existence oC cost monotonic selections from the set oC Pareto opti-
mal and individualIy ratiollal allocations. Such selections exist iC and only iC the 
preCerences oC the agents satisfy what we call the equal ordering property. This 
requirement is very restrictive in the context oC more than one public good. How-
ever, whenever it holds any such mechanism must choose an egalitarian equivalent 
allocation. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Consider the question of finding the optimal ailocation of a bundle of public 
goods, and the way in which its cost should be shared by the agents who 
consume it. Most of the literature has concentrated on two aspects of this 
problem. Firstly, there is the controversy of designing mechanisms which 
induce the agents to reveal their utilities¡ one would expect that, in most 
cases, the agents have strong incentives to hide their true utility regarding 
the public goods. Secondly, as in the present work, there is the issue of 
selecting an optimal bundle of public gOOds and distributing the cost involved 
in financing the production plan among the members in the Economy. 
To address this problem we adopt the normative approach: The solution 
is determined by considering sorne "equitable" properties which are agreed 
upon by the agents and express their sense of fairness. Once the relevant 
"ethical guidelines" have been acknowledged, one tries to pinpoint a solution 
complying with them. If one is found, then it is applied to the problem at 
hand. 
A universaily accepted property is Pareto optimality. Ailocations for 
which it is possible to improve the \Velfare of sorne agents without making the 
rest worse off, should not considered. However, Pareto efficiency by itself has 
one major drawback¡ it does not determine a unique allocation. Even worse, 
it contains proposals such as Clone agent absorbs ail the surplus" which are 
objectionable on grounds of non equitability. 
Individual rationality is another of the most widely accepted require-
ments for a solution to have. Since the technology is jointly owned by ail 
members of the society, it seems reasonable to require that the optimal pro-
duction plan and its financing should possess a certain degree of unanimity. 
In this framework, this corresponds to individual rationality; a possible ru-
location will be objected to by sorne member who operating the technology 
on his own, could improve his utility. 
The same objection to the one considered aboye for Pareto optimality 
ruso applies to the latter solution concept: quite often, the set of individuruly 
rational allocations, even with the added requirement of Pareto optimality, 
turns out to be a very large seto And there is no obvious way of picking an 
appropriate selection from it because there seems to be no single universal 
solution which would satisfy everyone's sense of fairness. This naturaily leads 
to the question of finding relevant situations in which there is a suitable one-
point selection process. 
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Another property considered in the literature as being desirable is "cost 
(or technological) monotonicity," Le., if the publicly owned technology gets 
better, then no agent should be worse off. Technological monotonicity was 
introduced by J. Roemer ([12]) and has been subsequently used to study 
sorne solution concepts (see, for example, [7, 9, 13]). 
In the case of just one public good, H. Moulin ([61) has characterized 
the egalitarian-equivalent solution, proposed originally by E. A. Pazner and 
D. Schmeidler [U], as the only selection from the set of Pareto efficient 
allocations which satisfies cost monotonicity and the Core property. Due 
to the interest of this result, it seems very natural to ask whether it can be 
extended to wider contexts. 
In the present work, we characterize when such an extension is possible. 
We find that in a setting very similar to the one in [6], but with several public 
goods, the a.'<ioms we have just discussed are not always compatible when 
taken together. As we prove in Section 4, under sorne mild assumptions, 
there is a mechanism satisfying the three properties aboye if and only if the 
preferences of the agents satisfy the equal ordering property. This latter con-
dition, which is very natural in the context of one public and one private good 
(as in [6]), is severely restrictive in general. For example, with quasilinear, 
strictly increasing preferences in public goods, the equal ordering property 
is equivalent to the assertion that all the agents have the same ordinal (but 
not necessarily cardinal) preferences on public goods. 
Thus, with several puLlic goods, one needs to impose additional restric-
tions on the preferences of the consumers in order to find cost monotonic and 
individually rational selections from the set of Pareto efficient allocations. 
On the other hand, when sllch a mechanism exists, then: (1) It must 
pick an egalitarian equivalent allocation; (2) the latter form a subset of the 
core; and (3) all cost monotonic mechanisms are equivalent, Le., they provide 
the same utility profile to the agents. Thus, the results in [6] cover essentially 
all the cases for which a cost monotonic selection mechanism from the set of 
Pareto optimal and individllally rational allocations is possible. 
The difference between just one and several public goods is that, in 
the first case, there is no conflict of interests: everybody likes more of the 
public good. Nevertheless, with more than one public good to choose from, 
different agents might differ in their opinions about which should be given 
priority over the others creating, thus, a possible source of conflicto Clearly, 
under the equal ordering property, these discrepancies in priority do not arise. 
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2 THE MODEL 
We consider economies with one private good and, possibly, more than one 
public good. The space of public goods is X = lR.~, with m ~ 1. These 
are produced at a cost which is financed by the members of the society. 
The technology available to produce the public goods is described by a cost 
function e: X --+ 14. Given y E X, the cost, in terms of the private good, 
needed to produce the bundle y of public goods is c(y). In addition, the 
technology is jointly owned by aH the agents and only one bundle of public 
goods is eventually produced. 
We will assume that whatever technology we consider, it exhibits sorne 
bounded returns to scale when producing very large bundles of public goods. 
Of course, this does not preclude having arbitrarily large increasing returns 
to scale for public goods within sorne compact seto 
Assumption 2.1 TILe teclmology e : X --+ lR.+ is conlinuous, nondecreas-
ing, salisfies c(O) = O and 
lim sup lIyll < +00. 
111111-+00 c(y) 
We use the Euclidean norm Ilyll = VLk=1 y~. For the purposes of com-
puting the lim sup we adopt the following convention: Consider the extended 
realline R* = lR U {+oo, -oo}. We also extend the usual ordering on lR 
to R* by defining -00 < x < +00 for any real number x E lR. and we let 
lIyll/c(y) = +00 whenever c(y) = O. 
As usual, the ordering in Euclidean space is defined as follows. Given 
two vectors x,z E lR~, x ~ z (resp. x» z) mean s that x¡ ~ z; (resp. 
x¡ > z¡) for every i = 1, ... , mi the notation x > z indicates that x ~ z and 
x '" Z. 
We let N = {1, ... , n} denote the set of agents. The ini tial endowment 
of private good for agent i E N is w¡ E lR+ (w¡ = +00 is allowed). Each 
agent i E N has prefel'ences over public and private goods represented by a 
utility function u¡ : X X y; --+ lR, where Yi e lR is his consumption set of 
private good. By abuse of notation and fol' simplicity, we will write tJ.¡(y, t) 
rathel' than u¡(y,w¡ - t) . In other wol'ds, for each i = 1, ... , n, tJ.¡(y, t) is the 
utility obtained by agent i when the bundle y of public goods is implemented 
and he has to contribute the amount t from his private endowment towards 
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its financing. The payrnent t could be negative, meaning that agent i E N 
receives some compensation from other ngents for accepting the bundle y 
instead of another one he might have preferred to y. 
We use the notation x(S) = ¿¡eS X¡ for a non empty subset S ~ N and 
a vector x E RQ, with S ~ Q ~ N. 
Assumption 2.2 For eaeh agent i E N, the following assumptions hoid: 
(i) Y¡ = [-w(N),w¡]. 
(ii) 17¡e utility funetion u¡ ; X X Y; -+ lR. is eonliuuous non-deereasing in 
the first argument (publie goods) and strietly deereasing in lhe seeond 
(the private good). 
(iii) Given a given bundle o[ publie goods y E X, there is one and only one 
!P.(y) E Y¡ sueh that u¡(y,!p¡(y» = 11.¡(O,O) = O. TIte mapping !p¡(y) 
verifies 
li !p¡(y) O msup-- = . 
111111-+00 lIyll 
By (ii) and (iii) thel'e nre no public bads and the amount of prívate good 
which agents are willing to provide for the consumption of a fixed bundle of 
public goods is limited. Note thnt 11.¡(y, t) is decreasing in the prívate good 
to indicate that t denotes a pnyment. For convenience, we have normalized 
u¡(O,O) = O for each i = 1, ... ,n. 
Part (i) says that no ngent can contribute more than his own endowment 
to fund the construction of the public good¡ thus restricting total investment 
towards the construction of the public good to w(N). In case W¡ = +00, 
for sorne i E N then we tnke w(N) = +00. As mentioned aboye, agents 
are allowed to transfer part or 0.11 of their endowments to other agents to 
encourage them to accept a particular bundle of public goods. The results 
below will still hold whenever transfers of privnte good are not allowed, as 
long as the utility functions are (strictly) monotone in public goods. One 
needs only to modify the nrgument in Remnrk 5.1 in an easy way. 
It follows from (ii) nnd (iii) that, for i = 1, ... , n, the mappings !p¡ are 
non decreasing and satisfy !p¡(O) = O. 
We let Y = ni::1 Y; and extend the utility functions of the agents to 
X x Y, by u¡(y¡ t) = 11.¡(y, ti), with (y¡ t) = (y¡ tI, ... , tn ) E X x Y and i E N. 
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The utility profile of the agents is the mapping u : X x Y __ R n given 
by u(y;t) = (u¡(y,t¡), ... ,Un(y,t .. )). Likewise, we will also write cp(y) = 
(cp¡(y), ... , CPn(Y))· 
From now on, we n.,,< the set Y nnd a pro file of utilities satisfying as-
sumptions 2.2. An economy is a pair (u,e) consisting of nn utility profile 
nnd a technology. Since the utilities of the agents are fuced throughout the 
paper, we will use the notation e instead of (u, e) to denote nn economy. An 
allocation is ~ pair (z; t) E X x Y. The allocation (z; t) is feasible in the 
economy e for a non empty coalition S e N if c(z) ~ teS) with t E IliEs Y;. 
We will simply say that (z¡ t) is feasible whenever it is feasible for the grand 
coalition N. 
Given a technology e, nn nllocntion (z¡ t) is said to be Pareto optimal 
in the economy e if it is feasible and u(z; t) = u(y; s) for nny other feasible 
allocation (y; s) such that u(Z¡t) 5 u(y¡s). The set of Pareto optimal allo-
cations is denoted by p(c). A nonempty coalition S e N cnn improve upon 
nn allocation (z; t) if there is another allocation (y; s), feasible for S, such 
that u¡(y; s) ~ u¡(z; t) for ench i E S withat least sorne strict inequality. 
An allocation (z; t) is individually rntionnl (resp. in Core(e)) if no agent can 
improve upon it (resp. if no conlition can improve it). 
3 Egalitarian equivalent allocations 
One of the principleswe will be considering to determine the allocntion which 
is "optimal" for the society is cost monotonicity. As we will see, if a solution 
satisfying this requisite exists, then it has to select an egalitarian equiva-
lent allocation. In the present section, we review this notion. Consider a 
technology e : x -+ R+ satisfying assumption 2.1. 
Definition 3.1 Tlle sel o[ egalitarian equivalent allocalions is defined lo be 
EE(c) = {(x; t) E p(c): lher'e is z E X wiU, u(X¡ t) = u(Z¡ O)}, 
The bundle of publicgoods z appearing in the definition of EE(e) is 
the reference bundle, The egnlitarinn equivnlent solution was proposed by 
E. A. Pazner nnd D. Schmeidler ([ll]) nnd has been characterized in [21 nnd 
[6J. An alternative procedure to describe the set EE(c) (more appropriate 
for the present set up) is given in the following construction. 
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Let sm- 1 = {z E ]RfR : 
consider its positive orthant 
~-1 = S"'-1 nX 
Given Q E S;-1 define 
IIzll 
and 
= 1} denote the m - 1 sphere and 
~-1 _ S"'-1 n]Rm 
++ - ++. 
Fo(c) = {A E R+: there is (y¡ t) E X x Y with 
c(y) ~ t(N) and u(y¡ t) = u(Aa¡ O)} 
and the application flo : Fo(c) --+ R" by flo{A) = u{Aa¡ O). Note that 
Fo{c) :/: 0, since O E Fo{c). The function flo is nondecreasing because u is 
nondecreasing as well. 
The set of egalitarian le veIs along the raya E S~-1 in the economy e 
is defined as 
ELo(c) = {Aa: A E argmax flo} 
and the set oE egalitarian levels is 
EL(c) = U ELo(c). 
oES:o-1 
The feasible allocations supporting the egalitarian levels are the sets 
AELo(c) = {(Xi t) E X x Y : c(y) ~ t(N) and there is 
z E ELo(c) with u(X¡ t) = u(Z¡ O)}. 
The relationship between the two concepts presented aboye is given by 
the following observation. 
Remark 3.2 Suppose assumplions 2.2 hold and let e X -+ R+ satisfy 
assumption 2.1. 17ten 
U AELo(c) e EE(c) e U AELo(c). 
OES:,.;I oES:O-1 
The second inclusion might be strict whenever preferences are constant 
on the boundary of the positive orthant (e.g. Cobb-Douglas preferences). 
In such cases, the boundary of the positive orthant is contained in the set 
of egalitarian levels and typically will not be supported by Pareto optimal 
allocations. Remark 3.2 combined with the next straightforward result shows 
that under rather weak assumptions, egalitarian equivalent allocations existo 
The proof of it is in the Appendix. 
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Proposition 3.3 Suppose assurnplious 2.2 !lold. Theu, ELo(c) "" 0, lor any 
e : X - lR+ salislying 2.1 and any a E S++ 1. 
As the following example shows, when the number of public goods is 
greater thnn one, there are two problems associated with the egalitarian 
equivalent allocations: firstly, in mnny cases there is a continuum of egali-
tarian equivalent allocations which are not individually rational. Secondly, 
the ones which are individually rational, form a continuum of allocations; 
furthermore, there does not seem to be a natural procedure for selecting any 
one of them, since they yield different utilities to the agents. 
Example 3.4 The economy e consists of two public goods (so X = lR!) and 
two consumers with quasi-linear preferences in money given by the utility 
functions 
UI (y; t) = 2..fiji + 2,fih. - t, 
where y = (YI, Y2) E X. The cost of producing the bundle y E X of public 
goods is 
c(y) = YI + Y2. 
It is easy to compute ([6, 8]) that the set of egnlito.rio.n levels is 
EL(c) = {y E X : 4..fiji + 2,fih. = S} 
Only a strict subset of the egalitarian equivalent alloco.tions are individu-
ally rational. The set of utilities given by individually rational egalitarian 
equivalent allocations is 
Hence, not 0.11 the egalitarian levels provide individua11y rational a11ocations 
and, furthermore, there are several distributions of utilities in the set U. 
4 Cost monotonic mechanisms 
One wo.y to overcome the difficulties mentioned at the end of the last section 
is to consider alternative properties to those of optimality and technological 
monotonicity in order to narrow down the solution to the cost allocation 
problem. In this section, we consider whether any obstructions exist to con-
sidering individual rationality as a third axiom compatible with the other 
two just mentioned. 
11 
A mechanism R will be defined be10w to be a mapping assigning to 
each economy e a feasib1e allocation. In order to give a precise definition we 
need to specify the domnin of R. As a first step, we consider the following 
set for the admissib1e techno1ogies. 
Eo = {e: X - R+/c satisfies assumption 2.1 } 
However, there are cost functions e E Eo for which the economy e does 
not have any al1ocation which is indívidual1y rational for the agents. In 
order to avoid such economies, we will consider on1y techno10gies satisfying 
the condí tion 
El = {e E Eo : c(x Vy) ::; c(x) + c(y)}. 
where, given any two vectors x = (XI, ... , xm), y = (Yl' ... ' Ym) in Rm we 
denote xVy = (max{xl, YI}, ... ,max{xm, Ym}). The requirement c(xVy) ::; 
c(x) + c(y) guarantees that agents can benefit from cooperating. 
Remark 4.1 \Ve observe that for any e E El the set of individually rational 
and feasib1e allocations of e is non-empty. Indeed, 1et e E El and suppose 
that for each agent i = 1, ... , n, the vector (xi, ti) E X x Y; is a solution to 
the prob1em 
max{1L¡(z,7·): (Z,7·) E X x Y;, c(z) = r} 
Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 guarantee that there is a solution to the maximiza-
tion prob1em. Let X = xl V X2 V .•• V XR. Then 
R 
c(x) ::; L C(Xi) = t(N) 
i=1 
Hence, (Xj t) is feasib1e for the grand coalition in the economy e and every 
agent i E N will be at 1east as well off with (Xj t) as with (xi, ti). 
The domain El still ineludes some techno10gies which might be con-
sidered unreasonab1e 1ike cost functions which are constant on arbitrari1y 
1arge sets. \Ve will eventually show the non existence of mechanisms satisfy-
ing certain normative axioms. Of course, showing the non existence of such 
mechanisms for the smaller domain, immediate1y implies the same result for 
the 1arger one. Thus no 10ss of genera1ity is entailed in restricting further the 
domain of R to 
E = {e E El : c(x) > c(y) whenever X> y} 
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Definition 4.2 A mechanism is a mappi71g 
R: E-X;( rry¡ 
¡EN 
assigning to every teclmology c E E a71 allocalion, R(c), leasible in the eco n-
omyc .. 
A mechanism R is Pareto efficient (resp. egalitarian equivnlent) if 
R(c) E p(c) (resp. R(c) E EE(c)) for every cEE. It is individually rational 
if R(c) is an individually rational allocation in the economy c. The mecha-
nism R is said to be cost monotonic if, given two cost functions Cl, C2 E E 
such that Cl (y) :::; C2(Y) for evel'y y E X, it assigns allocations R(cj), for 
j = 1,2, such that u(R(c¡)) 2: U(R(C2))' 
In the context of one public and one private good, H. Moulin ([6]) 
has proved the existence of cost monotonic, individually rational and Pareto 
efficient mechanisms. He also shows that such a mechanism must select an 
egalitarian equivalent allocation. It is easy to check that Cl V C2 E E whenever 
Cl,C2 E E, where (Cl V C2)(Y) = max{c¡(y),C2(Y)}' Using this remarl~, one 
can verify that the same proof that is used in [6], also applies here to obtain 
the following resulto 
Lemma 4.3 Lel R be a Pareto oplimal and cost monotonic mechanism. 
Thenlor each CI, C2 E E we have lhal eilheru(R(c¡)) 2: U(R(C2)) oru(R(cl)) :::; 
U(R(C2)) 
We address now the main issue: given a fixed set of agents, are the 8X-
ioros of cost monotonicity, Pareto efficiency and individual rationality com-
patible? The key to answering this question lies in the equal ordering prop-
erty. 
Definition 4.4 We say lhal lhe agenls order lhe bundle 01 public goods 
equally (or thal lhe profile of ulililies u salisfies lhe equal ordering prop-
erty) whenever for each bundle ofpublic goods y,z E X ilu¡(y,O) > U¡(z,O) 
lor so me agent i E N lhen Uj(Y, O) 2: Uj(z, O) lor every olher agenl j E N. 
In other \Vords, the equal ordering property is fulfilled whenever given 
y,z E X, either u(y,O) 2: u(z,O) ol' else u(z,O) 2: u(y, O). So, if a consumer 
prefers to take the bundle of public goods z for free, rather than choosing 
bundle y, then so do a11 the other agents. This property eliminates the 
possible sources of disagreement among players in ranking the bundles of 
public goods. It clearly holds in the case of one public good. 
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Example 4.5 We illustrate this notion in the case of quasilinear utility func-
tions. The utility of each ngent i E N is given by 
Ui(Y, t) = b;{y) - t 
where bi : X -+ lR. is the utility obtnined by ngent i E N whenever he enjoys 
the bundle of public goods y E X for free. The equal ordering property 
is equivalent to the following statement: for each pnir of bundles of public 
goods y, z E X, either bi(y) ~ bi(z) for every agent i E N or else bi(z) ~ bi(y) 
for every agent i E N. 
We can now answer the question posed aboye concerning the compati-
bility of cost monotonicity, Pareto efficiency and individual rationality. The 
result stated below makes precise the conditions under which there is a so-
lution satisfying these three properties. 
Theorem 4.6 Let N = {1, ... , n} be a set 01 agenls whose profile 01 utilities, 
u = (Ul,"" un) : X X Y -+ R, salisfies assumplions 2.2. Then, there 
is a cost monotonic, Pa7'eto efficient and individually ralional mechanism 
R : E -+ X x Y il and only il u verifies lile equal ordering propeny. 
FUrthenno7'e, il such a mcchanism R : E -+ X x Y exists, then lor 
every technology e E E, 
(i) R(c) E EE(c). 
(ii) 171e map u(" O) is conslant on EL(c). In lact, u(a, O) = u(R(c)) lor 
anya E EL(c). 
(iii) EE(c) e Core(c). 
As a consequence, such a mechanism exists only if the agents have 
exactly the same ordinal preferences when the bundles of public goods are 
free. This condition, which clearly holds for economies with one public good, 
is very restrictive in the case of several types of public goods. Thus, the first 
part of Theorem 4.6 limits severely the existence of individually rational and 
cost monotonic selections from the set of Pareto optimal allocations. 
The second part makes explicit that, whenever the equal property holds, 
we are back in the setting of [6J. Namely, part (i) implies that Pareto op-
timal, individually rational nnd cost monotonic mechanisms coincide with 
the egalitarian equivalent cOl'l'espondence and by part (ii) all of them are 
14 
equivalent, since the agents are indifferent between them. Finally, it follows 
from (iii) tho.t any such mechnnism is also o. selection from the Core of the 
economy and that the egalitarian o.llocations are individually rntional and do 
not o.llow privo.te trnnsfers o.mong the o.gents. 
There is o. relo.ted liternture, in the context of monotonicity with respect 
to changes in resources ([14], [10]). The conclusion therein is tho.t Po.reto 
optimality and resource monotonicity are incompatible with other normo.tive 
properties such as individual rationality from equal division or envy-free. 
The egalitarian equivalent solution has also been characterized by Pareto 
efficiency, monotonicity o.nd o. certo.in notion of fairness with respect to sorne 
commodity ([2]). These authors also show that the equity axiom cannot be 
imposed on more than one commoditYi thus their results show the strength 
of the monotonicity Il..'{iom in another setting. 
We finish this section with two remarks. Firstly, we could extend the 
domain of the mechanism to allow for changes in the number of agents. \Vith 
this modification we could o.lso consider the Il..'{iom of populo.tion monotonic-
ity: roughly speo.king, when the number of plo.yers increases, the cost of 
financing the optimal bundle of goods is shared among more agents. Thus, 
population monotonicity requires that by increasing the number of players 
everybodyshould be no worse off as befare. It is easy to argue that the axioms 
of population monotonicity and Pareto optimality imply the Core property 
and, hence, individual rationality. Therefore, Theorem 4.6 also holds when 
we replace "individual rationality" with "population monotonicity." 
Secondly, if assumptions 2.2 hold, then there are plenty of cost mono-
tonic, Pareto efficient (but of course, not individually rational) mechanisms 
defined on Eo. It is straightforward to check the following result: Fix 
a E 5'+.+ 1. Then, the map R which assigns to each e E Eo any allocation 
R(c) = (Yi t) E EE(c) such that u(y; t) = u(Aa; O), with A E R satísfying 
.Aa E EL(c), is cost monotonic. The problem, as remarked aboye, is that for 
sorne technologies e E E, the allocation R(c) = (y; t) will not be individually 
rationa!. This example also shows that the nxiom of cost monotonicity ruone 
cannot discriminate among the different ego.litarian equivalent allocations. 
15 
5 PROOFS 
We first make a simple but useful observation, 
Remark 5.1 Let S e N be a non empty coalition, let (y; t) E X X yS be an 
allocation fensible for S and let v E lRs such that v, ~ u,(O, O) for each i E S, 
Suppose that for every i E S we have u,(y, ti) ~ v" with sorne inequality 
being strict, Then, 7' E ys exists such that the allocation (y; r) is fensible 
for S and, for every i E S, U.(y,1',) > v" 
Indeed, assume without loss of generality that uJ (y, tJ) > vJ ~ uJ (O, O) = 
uJ(Y,!PJ(Y))' Then, tJ < !PJ(Y) ::; WJ, so we can find e > O small enough 
so that 7'J = tJ + e < !PJ(Y), uJ(y,7'd > VJ and for i E S \ {1}, ri = 
ti - ef(ISI- 1) > -w(N). Therefore, l' E ys, t(S) = 1'(S) and u.(y, ri) > Vi 
for every i E S, O 
The following Lernma shows that in the definition of FQ(c) one can 
replace u(y; t) = u(Aa; O) by u(y; t) ::; u(Aa; O). It will be used in the subse-
quent proofs. 
Lemma 5.2 Let e E Eo, v be a vector in lRn such that v ~ u(O; O) and 
(Yj r) E X X Y be a feasible allocation such that 
u(y; 1') ~ V ~ u(O; O) 
Define L : lR --+ Y by 
L(A) = {t E Y : C(AY) ::; t(N) a1l.d U(AY; t) ~ v} 
and let A. = sup{A E lR: L(A) f 0}. TILen, A. < +00, L(A.) f 0 and for 
any s E L(A.) we have thal u(..\.y; s) = v, 
Proof 
First, note that L(l) f 0. Let {..\d~J be an decreasing sequence converging 
to A •. For each k = 1, ... ,00, let Sk E L(Ad such that (AkY; Sk) is feasible 
and 
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In particular, we have that <P(>'kY) ~ Sk for every k = 1, ... , oo. We clairn 
that A. is finite. Otherwise, the sequence {Adk.:1 diverges to infinity and, 
by assumption 2.2, for each i = 1, ... , n 
l· s~ < l· <Pi (AkY) O Irnsup -
II 
\ 11 - Irnsup 11 \ 11 = k_ca I\kY k-ca I\kY 
Therefore, 
. C(AkY). ¿iEN S~ 
O ~ hrnsuP -
11 
\ 1I ~ lirnsup 11 \ 11 = O k-ca I\kY k-ca I\kY 
but this contradicts assumption 2.1. 
We concIude that {>'dk is a bOllnded sequence and A. is finite. Since 
Sk ~ <p(AkY) ~ <p(>..y) for every k = 1,2 ... , we also have that the sequence 
{Sk}~1 is bounded. Taking an appropiate subsequence we rnay assume that 
(AkY; Sk) converges to, say (>'.y; s.). Since y is a closed set and e is con-
tinuous, then (A.y; s.) E X x Y is also a feasible allocation. In addition, 
U(A.y; s.) ~ v, becallse u is continuous. Therefore, s. E L(A.) # 0. 
Finally, let s E L(A.) and suppose that U(A.y; s) > v. Say, UI (A.y; SI) > 
VI ~ UI (O, O). Then, SI < <PI (>..y), so we can find rl E YI with SI < rl < 
<PI (A.y) and still UI (A.y; 7·¡) > VI. Take tI = rl and ti = Si, for i = 2, ... , n. 
Then, t E Y and teN) > seN) ~ C(A.y). By continuity and Assumption 2.1, 
we can find A > A. such that C(AY) ~ teN). Then, (AY; t) E X x Y is feasible 
and U(AY; t) ~ V contradicting the definition of A •. Therefore, U(A.y; s) = v. 
O 
ProoC oC Remark 3.2: The second incIusion is cIear. To prove the first 
one, let o E s+¡1 and let (z; 1·) E AELo(c) be a feasible allocntion supporting 
the egalitarian level Aoa E ELo(c) with >'0 E R+; that is U(Zi r) = U(AoO, O). 
We only need to show that (Zi 1·) E p(c). Suppose noto Then, there is another 
feasible allocation (Yi t) E X x Y sllch that 
U(Yi t) > U(AOO; O) ~ u(O; O) 
By Rernark 5.1above, we can find ,. E Y such that c(y) = l·(N) and 
u(y; 1·) » u(>'Oo; O) 
Let >. = sup{A E R: u(y; 1·) » u('\a; O)}. Since, l·(N) = c(y) ~ O, there 
is sorne io E N such thnt '·io ~ o. Hence, U¡o(>.a, O) ~ Uio(Y, rio), whenever 
'\0 ~ y. Therefore, '\0 < >. < oo. 
17 
It cannot be the case that u(y; 1') > > u(Xa; O) because if it were we 
may find J.l. > X such that u(y; 1') > > u(¡ta; O). Hence, we must have that 
u(y; 7') ~ u(Xa; O) > u(Aoa; O) 
Applying now lemma 5.2 with v = u(Xa; O) we find A. E 1R and s' E Y such 
that (A.yj s') is feasible and U(A.yj SO) = u(Xaj O). But this contradicts that 
.\oa E ELo(c). 
o 
We are now in a position to prove the existence of egalitarian equivalent 
allocations. 
ProoC oC Proposition 3.3: 
Let e E E and a E S~+t. Consider a non decreasingsequence {Ak}k:l e 
Fo(C) such that 
For each k E ]N there is an allocation (!/'; tk) E x x Y feasible in e such that 
U(AkQj O) = U(ykj tk). 
Assume that the sequence {yk} k is unbounded. We may find an increas-
ing unbounded subsequence which, for simplicity, we also denote by {ykh. 
Using that u is non decreasing in public goods, we have that 
U(yk; tk) = u(Aka; O) ~ u(Oj O) = u(if; ep(yk)). 
Hence, tk ~ ep(if) for every k E ]N and assumption 2.2 implies that for any 
agent i = 1, ... , n, 
. t~ . epí(yk) 
hmsuP-11 kll ~ hmsuP - 11 kll = O k-oo Y k-oo Y (5.1) 
by adding these equations we get 
O < l' C(yk) _ l' LíEN t~ - O 
- tmsup I1 kll - tmsup 1I /e I1 -k-oo y k-oo Y (5.2) 
which contradicts assumption 2.1 
Hence, {ykh must be bounded. It follows now from Equation 5.1 that 
for each i E N, the sequence {t:h is hounded aboye and, thus from Equa-
tion 5.2, there is also an infinite sub sequen ce of {t~h bounded below. 
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By tnking nppropriute subsequences \Ve mny nssurne {ykh converges to 
a lirnit, sny y nnd {tkh converges to, sny tO. By continuity, the nllocation 
(y; tO) is fensible. 
Suppose first thnt sup(F,,(c)) = +00. Then the sequence P'k}~l is 
unbounded. Fix ko, A E lR such thut AkoCt ~ y nnd A ~ Ako' Given k E lR 
large enough so that Ak ~ A, \Ve huve 
By tnking lirnits as k tends to infinity, \Ve obtain the inequality u(y; O) ~ 
U(ACt; O) ~ u(y; tO). Let tia = max{tj, ... , t~}. Since O ~ c(y) ~ tO(N), we 
must have tia ~ o. On the other hund, since preferences nre decrensing in 
the arnount pnid nnd 'lLia(y; O) ~ u¡a(Y; tia)' we must also have that tia ~ O. 
Therefore, tia = O and tO = O. 
It follows that u(y; O) = U(ACt; O) whenever A ~ Aka. Hence, the map-
ping HQ is continuous and constant for A ~ Ako' SO it must attain its maxi-
murn. 
If sup(Fn(c)) = 1imk_oo Ak = A a finite nurnber, then 
U(ACt; O) = lim U(AkCt; O) = lim U(yk; tk) = u(y; tO), 
k-oo k-.oo 
SO A E FQ(c). 
Next, we start the preliminuries to pt'ove Theorem 4.6. 
o 
Lernrna 5.3 Lel i E N and y E X. Then, lhere is a conlinuous, non-
decreasing lunclion d¡ : lR+ - lR+ such lhat 
(i) JI A ~ 1, tllen, d¡(A) = O. 
(ií) JI A ~ 1, tlLcn, u¡(Ay,d¡(A)) =.u¡(y,O). 
Proof 
Fix A ~ 1 and let h: lR+ -lR Le defined by h(s) = U¡(AY, <p¡(sy)). Then, 
and 
h(O) = U¡(AY, <p;(0)) = ui(Ay, O) ~ 'ILi(y, O) 
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Since h is continuous, there is S(A) E [O, A] such that h(S(A)) = U¡(AY, !p¡(S(A)Y)) = 
U¡(y, O). We define di(A) = !Pi(S(A)y). Note that d¡(A) is uniquely defined 
because u is strictly increasing in the second argumento Also, O = di (l) $ 
di(A) $ !p¡(AY), since !Pi is increasing. 
In addition, di is continuous and non-decreasing, since is defined im-
plicitely by the equation 
Thus, we can extend di(A) continuously to [0,1] by requiring that it vanishes 
in that interval. O 
Lernrna 5.4 Let y E R~-,+ be a bundle o/ public goods in the interior o/ 
X. 171en, a teclmology ey E El exists sucll tllat u(Z¡ t) = u(y¡ O) lor any 
(Z¡ t) E X X Y which is an individually rational and Pareto efficient allocation 
in the economyey. 
Proof 
Let G). = a ([O, Ay]) be the boundary of the set {x E X : O $ x $ AY}. 
(The boundary is taken as a topological subset of X.) For each i E N choose 
di as in Lernrna 5.3 and let 
d = dI v··· Vdn 
Define now 
cll(x) = 2nmax{d(A),A -1} 
where A is the unique point in R+ such that x E G).. Note that ey(x) = O if 
x $ Y so, in particular, (y; O, ... ,O) is feasible in ey. In addition, c(x) > O if 
x E G). with A > 1. 
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>'Y 
y 
-GÁ 
Z 
For each x E GÁ we ha.ve " x II~ >'11 y 11 and Cy(x) ~ (>. - 1). So, 
lim sup 11 X( ')' ~ lim sup >.\ 11 y 11 < +00 
11"'11 ..... +00 C¡, x Á ..... +oo A - 1 
Let x E GÁ1 , Z E GÁ2 • Assume, without loss of generality, that >'1 ~ >'2. 
Then X ~ >'IY and z ~ >'2Y ~ >'IY. Hence, X V z ~ >'IY SO X V z E GÁ1 and 
c(X V z) = c(x) ~ c(x) + c(z). Therefore, Cy E El. 
Let now (z; t) = (z; tI, ... ,tn ) be an rulocation which is individuruly ra-
tional and Pareto efficient in c;, with z E GÁ • Denote by t io = max{t l , ... , tn}. 
Suppose that z ~ y and tio = O. Then, t = ° and u(Z; t) ~ u(y; O). Hence, 
by Pareto optimality, u(z; t) = u(y; O) and the proposition is proved. If 
z ~ y and tio > 0, then U¡o(z; t) < Uio(Y, O) with y feasible for io. But, this 
contradicts that (z¡ t) is individua.lly ra.tionru. 
Otherwise, z fÍ. [O, y], so >. > 1. Aga.in, by feasibility, ° ~ Cy(z) :5 t(N). 
Therefore, 
t io ~ ey(z) ~ 2d(>') n 
It follows tha.t, tio ;::: 2d(>') ;::: 2dio (>'). Assume thnt dio (>') > 0, then 
t io > dio (>') and 
Uio(Z,tio ) < U¡o(z,dio (>'»:5 Uio(>.y,dio (>'» = U¡o(Y,O) 
so (z; t) cannot be individunlly rntionru because agent io would be strictly 
better off by devinting to the nllocntion (y; O), which is fensible for him. 
Hence, we must hnve thnt dio (>') = O. But then Uio(>'y,O) = Uio(y,O), 
so 
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By individual rationality, tLio(Y,O) = Uio(z,tia) = Uia(z,O). Hence, tia = O 
and it follows that ey(z) = O. But this contradicts that z E CA with A > 1. 
O 
We say that sequence {2'}~1 e Eo converges to c E Eo, whenever for 
every z E X, we have limk_oo 2'(z) = c(z). 
Lernrna 5.5 Let {2'}k'=1 e Eo be a sequence eonverging lo c E Eo and lel 
{(Zkj tk)}k:1 e X x Y be a sequence 01 alloealions su eh Ulal lor every k E N, 
U(Zkj tk) ~ u(O, O) and (z\ t.k) is individually ralional and Parelo oplimal 
in Ute economy 2'. Suppose Ulal {(Zk j tk)}~1 converges lo (Zj t). Tllen, the 
alloealion (Zj t) is individually mlional and Parelo oplimal in Ule economy c. 
Proof 
The allocation (Zj t) is feasible because for each k E ]N we have that ck(zk) ~ 
tk(N) with lk E Y. Since the lntterset is closed, by taking limíts we have 
that c(z) ~ t(N) and t E Y. 
Note also that, by continuity, u(Zj t) ~ u(Oj O). Suppose (Zj t) is not 
Pareto optimal. Then, there is another allocation (x, r) E X x Y which 
satisfies c(x) = 1'(N) and u(x; 1') > u(z; t). By remark 5.1 we may assume 
there is another feasible allocation (x; s) E XxY such that u(x; s) » u(z; t). 
By increasing s slightly, we may also asslune that s(N) >c(x). 
Since the sequen ce {(Zk; tk)}~1 converges to (z; t), there is No E N 
such that whenever k ~ No we have 
The sequen ce ck(x) converges to c(x) < s(N) so, by a continuity argu-
ment, we can take NI E lN, NI ~ No such that for every k ~ NI we have 
ck(x) ~ s(N) and u(x; s) » u(Zk; tk). But this contradicts that (Zk; tk) is 
Pareto optimal in 2'. 
A similar, but simpler argument shows that (z; t) is individually rational 
in the economy c. O 
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Remark 5.6 Let c E Eo and consider the set 
n 
A(c) = {(y; t) E X X Y : c(y) = 2:)., u(y; t) ~ O} (5.3) 
.=1 
From assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 \Ve huye that for any technology c E Eo and 
any agtmt i E N, 
<,o. (y) 
lirn sup -'- = O 
111'11 .... "" c(y) 
Thus, if cE Eo, (y; t) is feasible and Ilyll is large enough, there rnust be 
sorne agent io E N sllch that tio ~ c(y)/n > <'oio(Y). Therefore, Uio(y, tío) < 
U'O (y, <'oío (y» = Uio (O, O) = O 
It follo\Vs that there is M E R sllch that lIyll ::; M whenever (y; t) E 
A(c). In addition, since c(y) = Li=1 ti ~ O and ti ::; <'oi(y) for each i = 
1, ... , n, we conclude that the set A(c) is bounded and has cornpact closure. 
Note that the set of feasible and individuaIly rational allocations is a subset 
of A(c). 
Now we can prove the "only if" part of Theorern 4.6. 
Proposition 5.7 Let R be a cosl monotonic, Pareto efficient and individu-
ally ralional mechanism. TILen, 
(i) For any function c E E, R(c) E EE(c). 
(ii) For every leclmology c and Q E EL(c) we have thal u(Q, O) = u(R(c», 
i.e. the map u(., O) is constant on EL(c). 
(iii) The ulilily profile u = (UI, ... I Un) salisfies lhe equal ornering propeny. 
Proo! 
(i) Fix a technology c E E and suppose R(c) = (x; t). Let z E R';+ be bundle 
of public goods which is strictly positive. We wiIl prove that u(R(c» = 
U(AoZ; O) for sorne Ao E R+. 
Given A E R+ we rnay apply Lemma 5.4 with y = AZ to construct 
CAl E El. Clearly, for each é E (0,1], the technologies 
C~z = éC + (1 - é)C.xz 
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belong to E. 
The set A(eo), defined uy equation 5.3, with eo(9) = min{c(9),CAz(9)} 
is a bounded subset of X x Y .The set of feasible and individua11y rational 
allocations of a11 the economies ¿Az with é E [0,1], being a subset of A(~), 
is also bounded. Bya compactness argument, there is a sequence{ék}~l 
contained in (0,1), converging to O and such that the sequence {R(c~~)}f=l 
converges to a feasible allocation, say (z; t), in the economy CAz. 
Since R is Pareto efficient and individua11y rational, so is (z; t). By 
Lemma 5.4 we have that 
lim 'U(R(c~)) = u(z; I) = u(Az; O). 
k-.oo 
For each k E N, we may apply now Lernma 4.3 to obtain that either 
u(R(c)) ~ u(R(ci;,)) or else u(R(c)) ~ u(R(c~)). Bya limiting argument 
we conclude that for each A E lR.+ 
either u(R(c)) ~ u(Az; O) or u(R(c)) ~ u(Az; O). (5.4) 
Let A be large enough so that A:; ~ x. Since O ~ c(x) ~ L~l ti, there must be 
sorne agent, say io E N, such that tia ~ O. Therefore, uio(Az, O) ~ Uio(X, tia) 
and hence u(Az; O) ~ u(R(c)). Observe also that u(O; O) ~ u(R(c)). Let 
Aa = inf{,\: ui(R(c)) ~ u¡(Az, O) for all i = 1, ... ,n} 
By continuity, u¡(R(c)) ~ u¡(Aaz,O), for each i = 1, ... ,no Suppose sorne 
inequality is strict, say 
u¡(R(c)) < U¡(AOZ,O). 
Again, by continuity, there is X < Aa close enough to Ao such that we still 
have u¡(R(c)) < u¡(A'z,O). On the other hand, recalling the definition of 
infimum, there must be sorne index, say i = 2, such that 
The last two equations contradict equation 5.4. Therefore, u¡(R(c)) = u¡ (Aaz, O) 
for a11 i = 1, ... , n. 
(ii) Let now z E EL(c) and A E lR.+; by taking y = AZ in Lemma 5.4, 
we may construct CAz as in part (i) above and we may find A E R+ such that 
u(R(c)) = u(Az; O) 
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Since z E EL(e) and R(e) is fensible, then u(Z¡ O) ~ u(R(e». But R(e) is 
Pareto optimal, so u(Z¡ O) = u(R(e». This proves (ii) for bundles of public 
goods in EL(e). A simple continuity argwnents can be used to extend the 
result to all bundles of public goods in EL(e). 
(iii) Let i E N be an agent, and let y, z E 1R~+ be two bundles of public 
goods. Suppose that Ui(Y,O) > Ui(Z,O). Construct, ns above, ~., ~. such 
that limt_oo u(R(~·» = u(y¡ O) and limk_oo u(R(~·» = u(Z¡ O). 
By Lemma 4.3, for each k E lN, either u(R(~·» ~ u(R(~·» ar 
u(R(~·» ~ u(R(c;·». Byasslunption, 
lim 1.L¡(R(e~·» = 1.L¡(y,O) > Ui(Z,O) = lim 1.L¡(R(e~"». 
t-oo t-oo 
Thus, for large enough k, u(R(~"» ~ u(R(c;·» and, taking limits we obtain 
u(y¡ O) ~ u(Z¡ O). 
Hence, the equal ordering property holds for y, z E 1R~+. A simple 
continuity argument extends this property to Y,z E X = 1R~. 
o 
To finish we prove the converse of Theorem 4.6. The equal ordering 
property is a sufficient condition for the existence of cost monotonic mecha-
nisms. This property by itself also guarantees that the egalitarian equivalent 
allocations are in the Core of the economy. 
Proposition 5.8 Suppose ljle equal orderi71g property holds. Tllen, 
(i) Any egalitarian equivale71t mechanism is cost monoto71ic. 
(ii) EE(e) e C07·e(e). 
Proof 
(i) Let R be an egalitarian equivalent mechanism and let el ~ e2 be two 
technologies in E. Fo!" each i = 1,2, let R(e¡) = (yi¡ Xi) E EE(e¡) with 
u(Zi¡ O) = U(yi¡ Xi) for sorne Zi E X. 
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By the equo.l ordering property, either u(R(c¡)) = u(z¡j O) ~ U(R(C2)) = 
u(z2j O) or else u(R(c¡)) $ u(R(c:z)). But, C¡(y2) $ C2(y2) = x2(N), so the 
allocation R(C2) is feasible in the econorny c¡. Since R(c¡) is Pareto optirno.l 
in C¡, we co.nnot ho.ve tho.t u(R(c¡)) < U(R(C2)). Therefore, u(R(c¡)) ~ 
U(R(C2)). 
(ii) Let x E EL(c) and (Yj t) E EE(c) so tho.t u(Yj t) = u(Xj O). Suppose 
that there is a nonernpty coo.lition S e N and an allocation (Zj 7"') E X x yS 
such that c(z) = 7J (S) o.nd tLi(Z, 7;) ~ tLi(X, O) for i E S with sorne inequo.lity 
being strict. Consider the o.llocation (Zj 7·) E X X Y, where r, = O if i E N \ S 
and r, = 7·: if i E S. Then, c(z) = 7·(N), so (Zj 7·) is feasible for N. 
By the equo.l ordering property, either u(Zj O) ~ u(Xj O) or else u(Zj O) $ 
u(Xj O). However, u(Zj O) ~ u(Xj O) is not possible, because we would have 
that u(Zj r) > u(Xj O) contradicting tho.t the ego.lito.rian equivalent allocations 
are Pareto optirnal. 
Hence, we rnust have that u(Zj O) $ u(Xj O). Then, for each i E S we 
have the inequo.lities u,(Zj O) $ u,(x,O) $ tLi(Z,7·'). Therefore, r, $ O for 
every i E S. But 0$ c(z) = ,·(S), so 1", = O for every i E S. Hence, c(z) = O, 
Z = O and u,(O, O) = tLi(Z, 7") ~ tLi(X, O) ~ U,(O, O) for i E S with sorne 
inequality strict, which is a contradiction. O 
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